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Book	Review:	Rebel	Law,	Insurgents,	Courts	and
Justice	in	Modern	Conflict	by	Frank	Ledwidge
In	Rebel	Law:	Insurgents,	Courts	and	Justice	in	Modern	Conflict,	Frank	Ledwidge	explores	the	role	of
courts	and	law	in	insurgencies	and	civil	wars.	This	is	an	intriguing,	engaging	and	comprehensive	account	that	is
particularly	compelling	when	discussing	insurgent	justice	in	the	Muslim	world,	finds	James	Baldwin,	valuably
diverging	from	the	tendency	to	read	such	phenomena	solely	through	the	prism	of	extremism.	
Rebel	Law:	Insurgents,	Courts	and	Justice	in	Modern	Conflict.	Frank	Ledwidge.	Hurst.	2017.
Find	this	book:	
Rebel	Law:	Insurgents,	Courts	and	Justice	in	Modern	Conflict	is	a	fascinating
exploration	of	the	role	of	courts	and	law	in	insurgencies	and	civil	wars.	The	author,
Frank	Ledwidge,	is	a	barrister	and	former	intelligence	officer	in	the	British	military
who	has	had	a	varied	career	as	an	advisor	in	justice-related	development	projects,
including	in	the	British-occupied	Helmand	province	of	Afghanistan.	The	first	half	of
the	book	examines	how	a	variety	of	insurgent	movements	have	used	courts	and
law,	while	the	second	focuses	on	the	role	of	law	in	counterinsurgency	strategies,
including	a	critique	of	British	operations	in	Helmand.
From	the	perspective	of	my	discipline	of	Islamic	legal	studies,	the	first	half	of	the
book	is	of	particular	interest.	Ledwidge	recasts	the	sharīʿa-based	justice	systems
created	in	recent	conflict	zones	in	Afghanistan,	Somalia,	Syria	and	Iraq	–	usually
portrayed	as	reversions	to	barbaric	punishments	driven	ideologically	by	militants	–
as	a	phenomenon	comparable	to	other	insurgencies	in	non-Muslim	countries.
Observers	of	Afghanistan	have	noted	previously	that	the	Taliban	built	a	reputation
for	providing	justice	in	the	context	of	the	rampant	warlordism	of	the	1990s:	that	their	appeal	was	founded	on
fairness	as	much	as	the	specifically	Islamic	character	of	their	legal	regime.	But	Ledwidge	explores	this	idea	at
length,	and	illustrates	it	by	juxtaposing	Afghanistan	and	other	Islamic	examples	against	an	event	central	to
modern	British	history:	the	Irish	War	of	Independence,	when	Sinn	Fein	and	the	IRA	set	up	a	network	of	courts	in
Ireland	as	part	of	their	boycott	of	the	British	state.	Their	strategy	was,	of	course,	violent:	litigants	and	witnesses
were	intimidated	into	not	cooperating	with	the	British	justice	system.	But,	at	the	same	time,	Sinn	Fein’s	courts
were	widely	seen	as	fair	and	efficient.	Brute	force	was	not	sufficient	to	mount	a	successful	insurgency	in	Ireland:
the	republicans	also	had	to	offer	the	Irish	people	an	alternative	model	of	governance	that	they	would	accept.
Having	presented	the	Irish	case	as	the	paradigm	of	an	insurgent	judicial	strategy,	Ledwidge	then	explores	a
series	of	insurgencies	in	the	Muslim	world	in	which	law	and	courts	have	played	a	significant	role.	Beginning	with
the	Taliban	in	Afghanistan,	he	moves	on	to	the	Union	of	Islamic	Courts	in	Somalia,	competing	courts	run	by
mainstream	opposition	forces	and	by	the	jihadist	Jabhat	al-Nusra	group	in	rebel-held	Aleppo	and,	finally,	the
judicial	activities	of	ISIS	in	Syria	and	Iraq.
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Image	Credit:	Nawa	District	Justice	Centre,	Helmand,	Afghanistan,	2011	(ResoluteSupportMedia	CC	BY	2.0)
These	various	court	systems	represent	a	range	of	models	of	justice.	The	Taliban,	Jabhat	al-Nusra	and	ISIS	all
claimed	to	‘restore	sharīʿa’	–	by	which	they	meant	implementing	a	hardline	interpretation	of	sharīʿa	complete	with
harsh	corporal	punishment	and	attention	to	moral	infractions.	Somalia’s	Islamic	Courts	were	not	driven	by	such
an	ideological	Islamist	agenda:	they	still	relied	partly	on	sharīʿa,	Somalia’s	major	legal	tradition,	but	were	more
eclectic	in	their	interpretation	of	it	and	also	used	customary	law.	Meanwhile,	the	courts	affiliated	with	Aleppo’s
mainstream	rebels	ran	the	kind	of	civil	law	system	that	is	typical	of	most	Arab	countries	today,	using	a	code	of
largely	European	extraction	along	with	elements	taken	from	the	sharīʿa	tradition.
But	even	in	the	most	ideological	of	these	insurgencies,	the	sharīʿa	element	was	incidental	to	the	courts’	appeal
and	success.	What	mattered	was	their	efficiency	and	fairness,	in	the	sense	of	procedural	regularity	and	refusal	to
accept	bribes.	What	made	these	courts	effective	tools	of	insurgency	was	that	they	brought	order	and	stability
where	previously	there	had	been	chaos,	and	that	their	procedural	standards	compared	favourably	with	the
alternatives.	The	courts	were	a	key	component	of	the	insurgents’	pitch	to	local	populations.	Not	only	did	they
focus	on	preventing	the	kind	of	crimes	that	plague	communities	after	the	breakdown	of	the	state	–	kidnapping,
robbery,	extortion	and	so	on	–	they	also	sought	to	prevent	corruption	among	their	own	judges.
The	second	half	of	the	book	provides	a	critique	of	the	‘rule	of	law’	model	of	nation-building	that	the	US	and	its
allies	have	pursued	in	Afghanistan	since	the	2001	invasion.	Ledwidge	begins	this	section	by	discussing	how	older
empires	attempted	to	stabilise	remote	and	volatile	regions,	exploring	the	strategies	pursued	by	the	Ottoman	and
British	empires	in	Albania,	Yemen,	India’s	North	West	Frontier	Province	and	southern	Sudan	in	the	late
nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries.	Ledwidge	claims	that	both	Ottoman	and	British	imperial	elites	recognised	that
engagement	with	local	institutions	and	practices	was	crucial	to	success.	He	believes	that	US	and	British	forces
today	have	forgotten	this	lesson,	insisting	instead	on	the	centralised	state	as	the	solution	in	unstable	countries,
even	though	such	states	often	have	little	legitimacy	and	few	ways	to	build	it.
Ledwidge’s	treatment	of	the	British	empire	sometimes	seems	uncomfortably	nostalgic:	on	page	125	he	quotes,
apparently	approvingly,	Charles	Napier	bemoaning	that	‘so	perverse	is	mankind	that	every	nation	prefers	to	be
misgoverned	by	its	own	people	than	to	be	well	ruled	by	another’.	Ledwidge	argues,	based	on	military	manuals,
that	British	counterinsurgency	doctrine	in	the	mid-twentieth	century	emphasised	the	use	of	the	minimum
necessary	force	in	order	not	to	alienate	the	population.	But	he	doesn’t	do	much	to	explore	whether	the	British
response	to	insurgencies	lived	up	to	the	theory:	the	example	of	the	Mau	Mau	rebellion	in	Kenya	suggests	not.
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Ledwidge’s	criticism	of	the	British	intervention	in	Helmand	is	much	sharper.	He	reflects	candidly	on	his	own
experience:	at	the	time	of	his	posting	in	2007,	Ledwidge	writes	that	he	‘had	never	been	to	Afghanistan,	spoke
none	of	the	languages	and	had	but	the	haziest	idea	of	how	justice	was	provided	in	the	country’	(140).	His
background	was	typical	of	those	involved	in	‘rule	of	law’	development	projects,	and	Ledwidge	argues	that	the
resulting	lack	of	local	knowledge	is	one	of	the	key	reasons	why	most	have	failed.	In	the	place	of	deep
engagement	with	local	networks	and	cultural	traditions,	British	and	US	forces	adopted	a	‘cookie-cutter’	approach,
transposing	institutions	and	practices	based	on	western	models.	Ledwidge	argues	that	such	projects	are	doomed
to	failure	because	they	rely	on	an	authority	and	credibility	that	the	Afghan	state	lacks.
Ledwidge	describes	the	judicial	terrain	in	Helmand	during	2006-14	as	a	situation	of	legal	pluralism,	with	five
options	for	resolving	disputes:	the	formal	judicial	system;	government	officials	acting	informally;	tribal	elders;
religious	mullahs;	and	the	Taliban.	Litigants	responded	by	forum-shopping,	although	their	choices	were	often
constrained	by	fear	of	violence.	Within	this	range	of	options,	the	formal	judicial	system	was	not	only	ineffective
and	corrupt,	but	litigants	often	came	under	considerable	pressure	not	to	use	it.	In	such	circumstances,	investment
in	the	formal	judicial	system	typically	resulted	in	white	elephants,	such	as	the	expensive	but	empty	Justice	Center
built	by	the	US	in	Khost,	which	Ledwidge	claims	failed	to	attract	any	litigants.
Ledwidge	readily	concedes	that	the	alternatives	to	state-centric	solutions	–	engaging	with	local	and	traditional
practices	of	justice	–	also	raise	problems,	in	particular	the	lack	of	respect	for	gender	equality	and	human	rights
norms	among	many	local	figures	of	authority.	He	doesn’t	offer	a	solution	to	this	dilemma.	In	places,	he	seems	to
be	leading	towards	the	suggestion	that	concerns	about	gender	and	human	rights	must	be	jettisoned	if	such
projects	are	to	succeed;	but	he	backs	away	from	this	stark	conclusion,	citing	an	example	when	the	mission
successfully	secured	the	installation	of	women	members	on	a	local	judicial	council.	His	ultimate	conclusion	is
more	modest:	that	just	as	development	officials	should	be	candid	about	the	human	rights	failings	of	traditional
practices,	so	they	should	be	honest	about	the	Afghan	state’s	lack	of	capacity	and	legitimacy.
Rebel	Law	is	an	intriguing	and	engaging	book	that	covers	a	lot	of	ground.	Ledwidge’s	criticisms	of	the	nation-
building	project	in	Afghanistan	are	broadly	familiar,	but	they	are	presented	with	fresh	details	and	anecdotes	from
his	personal	experience	there.	Meanwhile,	Ledwidge’s	approach	to	insurgent	justice	in	the	Muslim	world	is
compelling:	he	brings	a	much-needed	comparative	perspective	that	serves	as	an	antidote	to	the	tendency	to	read
such	phenomena	only	through	the	lens	of	extremist	ideology.
James	E.	Baldwin	is	a	lecturer	in	the	Department	of	History	at	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London.	He	teaches
and	writes	about	the	Ottoman	Empire,	the	modern	Middle	East	and	the	history	of	Islamic	law.	His	first	book,
Islamic	Law	and	Empire	in	Ottoman	Cairo,	was	published	in	2017	by	Edinburgh	University	Press.
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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